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Enthusiasm for public management in administering the public's business has burgeoned over the past d e~a d e .~ This emphasis has borne a burden of hope (and hype) as public agencies (tagged inaccurately with the political epithet of "bureaucracies") continued to come under assault from aggressive politicians and unremitting fiscal crises. "Public management" subspecies proliferate, techniques and catch words gain standing, suffer the IRevision a paper for Public embarrassment of application, and subside leaving a residue of Management and Bureaucracy: The State puzzlement and analytical skepticism. It is necessary from time to time to ask about the theoretical 19, 1993 . I take the the panel standing of these views-not only for scholarly reasons, though as rhetorical and advisory; my referent these are too seldom stressed. It seems also apparent that at least will be theories of the behavior, dynamics, and effects of public and some of these views are taken seriously by reformers, eager politheir leaders. My thanks to Chris Ansell ticians, and congressional staff. Scholars who study public organiand Craig Thomas for their comments.
zations and teachers of some who inhabit them have an obligation to attend to the kinds of "state of the field" issues raised by this 'This is contrasted with a more mature public administration perspective and the symposium. This obligation rests on the tacit claims we make that "impact" emphasis of public policy. Often we are the stewards of theory building, teachers of potential used the setting practitioners, and advisors vis-8-vis the critique and reform of off "public administration," "public polongoing public organizations and the design of new ones. Given icy," or "public administration" "types" from one another, while similar to other the state of public organizations in the United States and in many territorial spotting behavior, serves at once other countries, it is a particularly important duty. The symposium nourish a propensity to avoid organizers are to be commended for their efforts in catalyzing the lytical critique and the search for cumulative possibilities and to confuse students event'
and practitioners.
The invitation to consider "the state of theory" was intrigu-' 1t also gives one permission to "sound ing, though the time allowed was quite brief. Accordingly, my off." I hope the outcome will not be a views are overly compressed, a ~aricature.~ They have been in-"pop off." tensified in recent years by: a) our work attempting to understand 4See LaPorte and Consolini (1991) and "high reliability organizations," that is, public or regulated Roberts (1989) The Berkeley Symposium: Plenary Roundtable institutional trustworthiness or public trust and confidence in the context of managing the nation's radioactive waste$ and c) an attempt in graduate seminar to set out the dominant conditions that now confront U.S. public organizations.
In considering the "state of theory," I find the news both mildly positive and somewhat unsettling: the good news is that recent symposia like this bring together researchers from public management and administration and those in political ~cience.~ These gatherings signal increased activity and possibilities. May their numbers and effectiveness increase. As Kettl's symposium talk and forthcoming paper nicely summarize, there have been interesting theoretical developments; these provoke and add yeastiness to our struggles to understand phenomena in and of public organizations.
The unsettling news is that, in its current state, "theory," while perhaps improving absolutely, exhibits a growing relative ignorance. The balance of my comments addresses this situation and outlines its implications. First, a note on context. "Theory" as used in the public managementhureaucracy literature has at least three connotations--often mixed or mixed-up in ways theoretical work is conducted. What follows is familiar but bears brief repeating.
"Theory" is used variously to typify or connote:
1. a guide to normative frameworks for managers and policy evaluators, for academics and pundits, and for political critiques of public organizations in democracies. This is a sizable literature. ~u c h of Kettl's symposium paper falls nearly in this category, and this perspective was in evidence at the symposium;' It has been argued that we lack a substantial and cumulative base of knowledge; that we run off in a remarkable variety of analytical directions (for example, T. Moe 1991) . This is certainly the case when we consider the status of strong tests of assertions, hypotheses, or theoretical fragments. What we draw from sociology, social psychology, and economics is fractured, and when it joined with concerns for problems of operations or political ideology it splays out in a messy pattern with limited cumulative effect.'' This is a familiar state of affairs in numerous academic areas. Should it be a matter of concern for us? I think so. A growing range of public organizations operate or regulate systems whose failures can set in train grievous consequences, not just for policy proponents or budget political harmony but directly for the safety and lives of citizens and consumers. Public organizations make a significant difference, and understanding them is imperative to the avoidance of operational decline and public damagebefore such organizations inadvertently lose their internal coherence and productive capacities. The quality of theory about public management, bureaucracy, and organization is important not only for academic purposes but because designers and critics need to take the theory seriously.
We face a situation in which, even as there are greater and more provocative efforts in theory building about public organizations and management, the phenomena of interest are differentiating and changing even more rapidly than our advances. Our grasp of the dynamics and behavior of public organizations is slipping further and further away: we know less of what we need to know, even as we know more than we did-and even as prescriptions for change and improvement proliferate.
How is it that as we work at greater intensity and higher rates (see the lists of topics at symposia like this) it can be argued that our ignorance grows? What are the conditions that produce this effect?
Public organizations face a striking array of conditions. Each presents demanding operational and theoretical challenges. In combination, they pose extraordinary descriptive and 7IJ-PART, January 1994 explanatory puzzles. Two important sources of analytical ignorance are the growing heterogeneity of public organizations and their embedding networks (see items A and B, exhibit 1). These networks are more than the familiar relationships and tensions of federalism and involve skeins of interagency1 contractor relationships that extend increasingly across national borders (cf. Kettl 1993) . In effect, the types and variations of public organizations are growing and their missions "speciate."" As a result, it is increasingly difficult to generalize from one or a "See Bozeman (1987) for an intriguing way of conceptualizing these differences, small set of agency behaviors to the dynamics of other agencies. 
Exhibit 1 Summary of Properties of/Facing U.S. Public Organizations

Imposed by Socio-Economic Environment
The Berkeley Symposium: Plenary Roundtable
In addition, public organizations face a daunting array of "environmental" conditions12 (see exhibit 1). Some are imposed by the socioeconomic environment, with little possibility that they could be changed rapidly through the efforts of ruling parties or executive action. Others are "inflicted by principals upon agents";13 for example, they are "inflicted" on public organizations by political regimes and stem from economic andlor administrative ideology. Each condition individually is more or less familiar; in combination they confound and confuse. It is a sobering ensemble within which to attempt flexible and effective operations. These conditions are especially daunting when the functions of public organizations are crucial for the political and social health of our communities.
In terms of our discussion, the conditions present a remarkably tough analytical challenge as well. For example, take any four conditions, holding the rest constant (though they would not be constant in real life). On what analytical basis could we predict confidently an organization's response? I set out three quartets below and invite your speculation. In considering these simplified (and artificial) situations, what degree of precision can be achieved--on the basis of current theory-in predicting the capacity of a public organization to operate coherently so that it avoids serious operating failure; maintains this capacity for a work generation; and manages to keep the public's trust and confidence in the process? How closely can speculations be derived from administrative, management, or organization theory? Set **.
(++ = increasing;-= decreasing)
++ Density of networks of relations among public organizations (B),
-Resources relative to operationaVtechnical need (E), 
++ Dependence on third parties (contractors) ( K ) , and
++ Demand for sewices with less tolerance for error (D).
++ Technical character of task processes (C).
Set <>.
(++ = increasing; -= decreasing)
++ Heterogeneity of goals and means (A), ++ National and agency policy volatility (I), - 
Public confidence in capacity of public organizations. (F) -Effectivenesslautonomyof senior management (0).
9IJ-PART, January 1994
To gain some purchase on these analytical (and design) problems, we can and mostly do retreat to conventional administrative and political wisdom. While this might be tempting, it should not be an early option for seekers after rigorous analysis. As an alternative, we can turn to an increasingly familiar set of middle range theories to nourish deductive speculation^.'^ They are:
Resource dependence and contingency theory; (New) institutionalism; Economic theories of organization and choice; Network theories of sociaVorganizationa1relations; Management and "bureaucratic" theories.
When the conditions listed above intensify, turning to these theories for inference and deduction gives small comfort. None of them furnish firm grounds for predictions about expected public organizational dynamics. They provide only limited insight into the complex situations in which most public organizations (managers and evaluators) find themselves. In short, we confront a theoretical shortfall, and uncertainty about the utility of our concepts of choice (and I do not mean public choice).
Four examples highlight the point. A dominant feature of high reliability organizations-that is, organizations that seek and attain very high levels of operating reliability-is the sense that the costs of some types of incremental trial and error learning exceed the value of the lessons learned. In the extreme and continuous possibility, the next error may be the last trial. In such organizations, we found theoretically unexpected behavioral responses in decision making, in patterns of authority, in processes of discovery (LaPorte and Consolini 1991; Roberts 1989; Schulman 1993) , and in responses to regulation (LaPorte and Thomas 1993) . We could derive only modest assistance from the empirical or theoretical literatures in providing plausible hypotheses or explanations.
Related work raised the problem of conditions in public organizations sometimes sustaining or, more dramatically, recovering public trust and confidence in advanced democracies. The initiating context was U.S. radioactive waste management policy and operations, an area in which the salient public and private conditions, say, as the properties of an agency's work processes for example, Citrin (1993) ; compare Hill vary or as its political environment changes (Thomas 1993a (Thomas ).15 (1992 This was particularly true when considering situations, I6This example also out of Our experience in the radioactive waste management arena. The depth of frustration among stakeholders has been great and D~O D O S~S --for radical reorganizations have been floated for at least k e e n years (DOE (1993) . "1 thank Chris Ansell for development of this point.
"Cf. trends in social work which have pursued a theoretical agenda emphasizing social networks.
The Berkeley Symposium: Plenary Roundtable again extreme but increasingly apparent, where the agency operates systems where there is intrinsically a long lag in the time needed to discover failure or determine success and the magnitude of consequences is high but the victims uncertain. Such an agency risks losing trust and confidence due in part to the weak applicability of current accountability processes (DOE 1993; LaPorte forthcoming).
In another important, perhaps more prosaic, vein, proposals for reorganization come fast (and loose) when operational problems and/or policy frustration mount-"what we can think up has to be better than what we have got."16 Such proposals often are offered for reasons other than enhancing the power of their proponents, as if they had good reason to suppose that other desired outcomes-for example, equity, efficiency, improved quality of personnel, speed of technical development, or enhanced safetypredictably would result. But there is little systematic evidence to support good-hearted enthusiasm or vindictive hopes in promoting one type of structural reform over others in public reorganizations. The relationship of particular organizational forms and the outcome values they are asserted to enhance is simply indeterminant. There is, of course, a good deal of organizational folk wisdom but no systematic knowledge of the types of effects particular structural changes have in securing the values that are subsequently enhanced (Thomas 1993b) .
A similar situation obtains in understanding the webs of relationships that bind and facilitate the work of public organizations." Clearly, agencies are enmeshed in spreading skeins of exchange relationships among a wide variety of private contractors and political groups and, of course, political executives and legislatures. This trend is likely to continue, perhaps accelerate, in an era of "reinvention" and other earnest efforts to "fix government" (for example, Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Some emphasis on complex interorganizational relationships, networks, might be drawn upon to explicate these developments. Organization theorists have stressed the importance of informal relations and the personal networks through which they operate, and studies of implementation and policy networks have employed the language of interorganizational networks. But this work remains far less developed than the networks the theories seek to describe. There has been little systematic work casting current network thinking in terms of public administrative or management phenomenon.''
Implications for Theoretical Work on Public Management (and Reform)
What implications does this argument have for scholarly agendas? First, it certainly calls for continued work on 11IJ-PART, January 1994
''See Barzelay (1993) .
The Berkeley Symposium: Plenary Roundtable integrating theories and rendering what we know in rigorous form with strenuous attempts to put these theories to the test. It also suggests that these tests should be conducted across a wider range of public organizational types than is now usually the case. If more representative tests were given, we could move with greater confidence toward more broadly applicable theoretical understanding. While most of us hold to this notion, I wonder how rapidly this could happen, or rather, what conceptual (contrasted to methodological) requirements must be met for broadly representative, credible public management and organizational studies?
A great many qualitative (and quantitative) differences exist among public organizations. I am struck by the extraordinary differences, for example, between management of social security or welfare agencies contrasted to public health service or terrestrial space development bureaus; between management of overcrowded state prisons contrasted with a large program in the support and conduct of performing arts, a tax collection agency, or a state lottery program. I have not included judicial, legislative, or military examples, though they should be taken into account. Are these differences so great-and their political environments so particular-that a broad theory of public management or administration is premature? I think it is, but I do not believe that these differences are so great that attempts to develop theories of the middle range should be denigrated or abandoned. The question could be put: What are the conceptual categories that would become catalysts or organizing principles for systematic theories about various "clumps" of the phenomena?I9 Second, the substantial list of stressor conditions presently "imposed" and "inflicted" on public organizations (exhibit l), seems on its face to confront public organizations and their evaluators with a much more rigorous, daunting, and endangering environment than has been the case for agencies and programs in the last half of this century. But these conditions do not confront public organizations equally. Some have to deal with only a few, others with almost the whole set. The more numerous and intensive these conditions, the more the agency and its services to citizens are endangered and the less likely the agency is to perform or adapt effectively. This suggests work that calibrates the degree to which imposed and inflicted conditions actually are thrust upon agencies. It also suggests studies that examine the limits of potential organizational capabilities when an agency or program faces particular clusters of these imposed and inflicted conditions. How effective can an agency be or become, given environmental conditions over which it has little control? We now lack theoretically well-founded bases for estimating the degree to which an agencylprogram could actually achieve politically demanded levels of effectiveness in the face of intensely imposed and inflicted conditions. We are challenged to provide analysis for reasonable expectations about the evolution and dynamics of public organizations else we should expect a growing number of managers facing an increasing proportion of "impossible jobs" (Hargrove and Glidewell 1990) . This would be a more credible basis for estimating the degree of improvement that depends on changes of the agency's environmental conditions, contrasted with those that are controlled by political executives and legislatures.
A third implication of this argument is the need to examine the utility (and likelihood of error) of formulations of policy, management, and leadership theory (or rhetorical arguments that are presented or taken as if they were theory) as a basis for the design or reform of new or existing institutions. This is particularly important when such theory or rhetoric is drawn upon in political debate, for example, in those instances where they are taken seriously by executive and legislative policy makers--either as means actually to redress problems or, more seriously, when they are taken up in the hope of demonstrating earnestness without much expectation for actual change. One rarely exercised aspect of this would explore more rigorously the full range of effects, especially the negative "surprises of success" or deferred regrets, were designs and changes based on such theories actually to be implemented at full scale.
This article ends with a first order hunch and a discouraging word: the first about the most fruitful next stages in our theoretical development; the second about resources. A next important theoretical stage would be the development of network theory in combination with resource dependence notions tempered by jousts with the organizational economists and used in the study of organizations in the public sector quite broadly understood. One underlying expectation is that the more extensive and dense the networks, the larger the error term in theories derived from economic paradigms. This expectation stems from the mismatch of economic paradigm's assumptions of relatively high levels of unorganized complexity (for example, quite high division of labor or differentiation with low levels of system interdependencies), while increasingly dense networks result in high levels of organized complexity (for example, degrees of differentiation and interdependence of component^).^^ 13IJ-PART, January 1994 "This point was raised during the symposium panel discussion by Harvey Averich, who noted, "During my eighteen at National Science Foundation (NSF), I never heard anyone come to us calling for a public administration grants program." it be that the reticence Of some of us public administrationtmanageresearchers to be separated from political sciene has overly inhibited us from seeking relief from the tender ministrations of the NSF political science program as a source for public organization studies? ACIR (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations) 1989 Reading on Federalism: Perspec-
